Projects

Seen but Not Credited- Why Information Remedies for Bias Depend on Who Evaluates
Making credentials visible is a common, low-cost remedy for evaluation bias, resting on the premise that a verifiable signal moves every evaluator toward merit. I test this premise in a randomized field experiment with 970 first-year MBA students at a leading Indian business school, who were randomly assigned, within 20 class sections over two academic years, to see either their current instructor’s name or a standardized profile showing the instructor’s photograph, doctoral institution and professional record before completing a teaching evaluation. Disclosure raised evaluations by 0.14 standard deviations on average. The gain was not shared uniformly. Male students rewarded male professors’ credentials by 0.28 standard deviations, while female students’ evaluations of the same professors did not rise. Measures of information receipt show why this is not a failure of attention - female students identified the credential at least as often as male students, yet disclosure raised male students’ rating of male professors’ achievements by 0.27 points and did not raise female students’ rating, a gap of 0.39 points (p = 0.02). The divergence arises when a signal is valued, not when it is seen, and it is not explained by evaluators’ stated beliefs about gendered access to academic careers. Information interventions, widely used in development policy and typically judged by whether recipients know more, therefore cannot be evaluated by receipt alone; what matters is whether the information is credited.
Behavior, Attention, and Belief - A Field Experiment on the Role of Identity in Discretionary Professional Interactions
Discretionary professional interactions, requests for mentorship, guidance, or support with no formal obligation to respond, shape advancement, yet whether they follow the equal-treatment norms enforced for formal decisions remains largely untested, since discrimination research is built almost entirely around settings where a decision-maker holds formal authority over a material outcome. We study this through a preregistered field experiment in which 7,281 Indian university faculty received outreach emails from real male student interns disclosing their own genuine caste identity, crossed with task complexity and financial incentives. Faculty engage similarly with advantaged and disadvantaged-caste students at the checkpoints an organizational audit would capture, clicking and completion. An exploratory attention measure, email reopens, tells a more tentative story - disadvantaged-caste emails are reopened somewhat fewer times, a gap concentrated under a financial honorarium, counter to the standard prediction that incentives narrow such disparities. A further, descriptive divergence separates behavior from belief among survey completers - STEM faculty click most often, yet report the least inclusive attitudes and lowest willingness to sustain engagement. Behavior, attention, and belief thus move independently under the same identity treatment, helping explain why the discrimination literature finds mixed results, and showing that response or completion rates, an audit’s most available metrics, need not reveal where equal treatment breaks down.
Incentives to Work Out- Evidence from Field Experiments (with U. Narang)
Firms designing incentive programs face important questions about their effectiveness - When do financial rewards work, when does social information work, and does combining them do more than either alone to influence consumer behavior? We address these using a randomized field experiment at a U.S. university recreation center, assigning participants of a group exercise program to one of four conditions - financial incentives (FI), rank information (RI), both (combined), or neither (control). Our results show that neither FI, RI, nor their combination significantly increases workout frequency or variety over the four-week intervention. However, FI and the combined treatment each improve goal completion (i.e., meeting weekly workout targets), relative to control, reflecting a shift in the temporal distribution of effort rather than an increase in total activity. Only the combined treatment shows persistence of effects on goal completion in the two weeks after the incentive period ends. Our mechanism analyses show stronger effects among participants who engage early on with the incentive program and explain the added value of rank information when paired with financial incentives for high-ranking participants and for openers of rank emails. The treatment effects are heterogeneous; the combined treatment works best for participants with salient intrinsic goals such as weight loss, whereas FI alone is effective for those without such goals. Both work better for consumers with past experience in the workout program. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of incentive programs depends on consumer motivation and program engagement with implications for how firms should target and structure wellness offerings.