Making credentials visible is a common, low-cost remedy for evaluation bias, resting on the premise that a verifiable signal moves every evaluator toward merit. I test this premise in a randomized field experiment with 970 first-year MBA students at a leading Indian business school, who were randomly assigned, within 20 class sections over two academic years, to see either their current instructor’s name or a standardized profile showing the instructor’s photograph, doctoral institution and professional record before completing a teaching evaluation. Disclosure raised evaluations by 0.14 standard deviations on average. The gain was not shared uniformly. Male students rewarded male professors’ credentials by 0.28 standard deviations, while female students’ evaluations of the same professors did not rise. Measures of information receipt show why this is not a failure of attention - female students identified the credential at least as often as male students, yet disclosure raised male students’ rating of male professors’ achievements by 0.27 points and did not raise female students’ rating, a gap of 0.39 points (p = 0.02). The divergence arises when a signal is valued, not when it is seen, and it is not explained by evaluators’ stated beliefs about gendered access to academic careers. Information interventions, widely used in development policy and typically judged by whether recipients know more, therefore cannot be evaluated by receipt alone; what matters is whether the information is credited.